有同时选择的两阶段动态博弈.pdf

Chapter 2 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information In this chapter we introduce dynamic games. We again restrict attention to games with complete information(i.e.,games in which the players’ payoff functions are common knowledge).We analyze dynamic games that have not only complete but also perfect information, by which we mean that at each move in the game the player with the move knows the full history of the play of the game thus far. The key features of a dynamic game of complete and perfect information are that ( ⅰ)the moves occur in sequence, ( ⅱ)all previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen, and (ⅲ)the players’ payoffs from each feasible combination of moves are common knowledge. P72 一、Basic Problems of dynamic games (一)Extensive-Form Representation of games In chapter 1 we analyzed static games by representing such games in normal form. We now analyze dynamic games by representing such games in extensive form. This expositional approach may make it seem that static games must be represented in normal form and dynamic games in extensive form, but this is not the case. Any game can be represented in either normal or extensive form, although for some games one of the two forms is more convenient to analyze. We will discuss how static games can be represented using the extensive form and how dynamic games can be represented using the normal form. Recall from chapter 1 that the normal-form representation of a game specifies: …… 博弈的扩展式表述 Definition The extensive-form representation of a game specifies: (1)the players in the game, (2a)when each player has the move(i.e.,the order of action ), (2b)what each player can do at each of his or her opportunities to move(i.e.,the moves set of each player), (2c)what each player knows at each of his or her opportunities to move(i.e.,if the players have perfect information), and (3)the payoff received by each