英语毕业论文：Small price to pay.docVIP

英语毕业论文：Small price to pay 　　 　　But the Huaxia incident and resulting investor anger highlighted how all too often in China, it’s unclear who ultimately bears the risk for bad investments. As China Economic Review went to press, the government was still investigating the incident to determine which party was responsible– negligent investors or dishonest bankers. 　　Bank on it 　　The Huaxia investors may be equally shocked to find out how insecure, at least on paper, their normal savings accounts are. Unlike most European nations and even developing South American countries, China has no insurance scheme to ensure deposit holders receive some of their money back if a bank goes out of business. The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which began in the 1930s and now insures conventional savings accounts up to US$250,000, provides an example of how such a system might be run. 　　Of course, most Chinese banks are majorityowned by the government, unlike in the US. Many Chinese interpret this to mean that the government would bail out any bank facing liquidation– in other words, as an implicit deposit guarantee. Savers with the Big Four banks may be justified in this view. In 1999, the government arranged for the Big Four to unload about trillion (US$ billion) in non-performing loans (NPLs) by selling them to four stateowned entities established with the express purpose of unwinding the loans. That bailout, as well as some similar transfers of NPLs in the 2000s, allowed banks to escape from their bad lending decisions. 　　But the government has also let financial institutions fail in the past. Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC), a state-backed investment vehicle, took billions in investor capital with it when it went bankrupt in 1999. Despite the belief that the government would rescue GITIC, creditors only recouped US$786 million of its US$ billion in debts. 　　These ad hoc decisions confuse investors, but a long-delayed plan to intro