煤矿职工不安全行为博弈分析资源经济与管理专业毕业论文.docxVIP

山东科 山东科技大学硕士学位论文 摘要 摘 要 我国煤矿事故的直接或间接原因 80%以上源于矿工的不安全行为。如果能分析清楚 煤矿工人选择不安全行为的原因或影响因素，从而能更好地控制和消除不安全行为，这 对搞好煤矿安全生产和预防事故的发生具有重要的现实意义。而矿工在工作中不安全行 为的选择都是一个博弈过程，是由于矿工、安全监督检查人员和煤矿企业本身利益的不 一致性，多方利益主体博弈的结果。为此，本文尝试用博弈论理论和方法对矿工不安全 行为的选择进行分析研究，探索出一条控制矿工不安全行为的路子。 本文建立了安全监督检查人员与矿工之间，煤矿企业与矿工之间，矿工与矿工之间， 矿工单人博弈的静态模型；通过分析不同条件下均衡，揭示了矿方、安全监督检查人员 和矿工从自身利益上是如何选择自己的行为和策略展开博弈，从而分析研究了矿工行为 的选择主要影响因素；同时建立矿工与安全监督检查人员之间的动态博弈模型，确定子 博弈精炼纳什均衡，通过对模型中各参数变动情况分析，研究了矿方对矿工行为选择进 行逐级控制的策略。根据多方的博弈分析，提出控制矿工不安全行为的策略，即通过建 立高效的监督检查机制、实施序列多级激励与约束机制和组织内部自控约束来控制矿工 不安全行为。 本文探讨了应用博弈论理论对矿工不安全行为进行分析和控制的途径，对煤矿选择 安全管理方法有重要的参考价值。 关键词：安全管理，矿工，不安全行为，博弈分析，控制方法 Abstract In China, more than 80% of the coal mine accidents are directly or indirectly from unsafe behaviors of employees. If we can find the influence factors of the miners unsafe behaviors and master the influence factors, it has practical significance to control and eliminate unsafe behaviors, and do well the safety production in coal mine and accident prevention work. And unsafe behaviors choice is a gambling process of multi-stakeholders, miners unsafe behaviors choice is due to the inconsistency of the miners, the department of mine safety and the interests of the enterprise, which is the result of the game by multi-stakeholder subjects. For this reason,this paper tries to use game theory and method to study and analyze unsafe behavior choice of miners and explore a method to control miners’ unsafe behaviors. This paper establishes static game models that are between control safety personnel and miners, miner and miner, a single miner. Through the analysis of the equilibrium of the different conditions, this paper deeply proclaims how to choose behaviors and strategy to game among coal mine, the department of mine safety and miners in their own interest for production safety, in order to analyze and researche the main influence factors of the miners behavior choose. At the same time,this paper constructs the dynamic game model between the department of mine s