科研院所下属企业委托代理关系-激励模型的研究-工业工程专业毕业论文.docxVIP

科研院所下属企业委托代理关系—激励模型的研究 科研院所下属企业委托代理关系—激励模型的研究 科研院所下属企业委托代理关系—激励模型的研究 摘 要 科研院所下属企业是一种附属于事业单位的经营实体，它是计划 经济向市场经济转型期的产物，是特殊的国有企业类型。在事业单位 改革的背景下，院属企业的发展瓶颈一方面是作为附属型实体的先天 不足，另一方面是作为国有企业在机制、体制和所有制上的局限。在 “增强活力、促进发展”的总方针下，院属企业的改革思路是通过完 善委托—代理关系建立法人治理结构，从而规范其经营管理行为。本 研究从人力资源角度出发，以院属企业经营者为研究对象，试图通过 重建激励制度完善委托—代理关系。首先，我们运用博弈论的方法对 常见的激励措施进行分析，指出委托代理双方对不同激励措施的选取 策略。其次，我们分析了院属企业及其经营者的特点，指出院属企业 代理人具有知识型员工和职业经理人的双重特性。在此基础上，我们 为院属企业委托代理双方建立了新的激励模型，并通过样本企业对该 模型进行实证研究。本研究提供了一套针对院属企业的激励制度设计 思路，包括理论依据、数理分析、参数设定、采样技术、实施细则等。 分析表明，应用这种方法能快速地建立一套适应院属企业委托—代理 关系特点的激励制度，新制度能有效规避代理问题，促进代理人为委 托人的利益最大化而努力工作。 关键词：院属企业，委托—代理关系，激励模型，博弈 A STUDY ON THE PRINCIPAL AGENT-INCENTIVE MODEL IN ENTERPRISES AFFILIATED TO RESEARCH INSTITUTES ABSTRACT The enterprise affiliated to research institute (EARI) is a special type of state-owned enterprise subsidiary to the Public Service Institute, and it appears at the period that the planned economy was transforming to the market economy. The obstacle of EARI’s developing is the characteristic of an adjunct and the limitation on mechanism, system and ownership of the state-owned enterprise. The key of EARI’s restructuring is to build the corporate governance in EARI by perfecting the principal-agent connection between the research institute and the manager. This study takes the manager of the EARI as object, and tries to perfect the principal-agent connection by rebuilding the incentive system of manager. First analysis is made on the common incentive measure by the game theory, and point out the inclination of choice of the client and the agent to these measures. Then the characters of the EARI and the manager are analyzed, by which it is found that the agent has the characteristic of the knowledge worker and the career manager. A new incentive model for the manager, and study the model by a sample is built. This study provides a method to the designing of the incentive system aim at the EARI, which consists with theory basis, mathematical