上市公司控制权转移后的大股东利益输送问题研究-企业管理专业毕业论文.docxVIP

浙江人学硕十学位论文 浙江人学硕十学位论文 上市公司控制权转移后的大股东利益输送问题研究 Abstract In recent years，many studies have found that concentrated equity is normal in corporation ownership structure，which challenges the traditional basic propositions of corporate governance based on equity dispersion．When corporate equity changes from centralization to dispersion，the main agency problem would evolve to the conflict between large stockholders and small shareholders．Many scholars have studied on control right transfer event，the comparative uniform viewpoint is that control right transfer could be an important mechanism that conquer the agency problem arising from managers and hence improves corporate governance．However， this viewpoint is still based on the classical hypothesis of equity dispersion．Under the centralized equity structure，whether the motivation effects control fight transfer and factors affect performance are different from the traditional agency hypothesis or not， is the main problem this paper intends to resolve． On the basis of studies on related literatures about large stockholders and control right transfer，this paper constructs generalized related party transactions，including related purchases and sales，related restructuring，funds occupation and related guarantee，and ultra-ability dividend payout as proxy variables of tunneling and propping．After collected 227 listed companies whose control right transfered from 1 999 to 2003，this paper conducted empirical tests on the relationship between big stockholders’tunneling and propping behaviour and the long—term performance of listed companies after control fight transfer．Firstly，through descriptive statistical analysis on proxy variables of sample companies between the time windows of 5 years from 1year before to 3years after control right transfer，behaviors of listed companies would be discussed．Secondly，through variance analysis and multiple regression analysis，it also would be researched that the relation