上市公司会计寻租行为及其对策研究-MPAcc专业论文.docxVIP

第 第 PAGE 10 页 Abstract From the middle of last century, Rent-seeking theory has been one of the most challenging areas of Western economics. This kind of activity, using resources through a political process to access privileges and harming the others’ interests rather than their own receipts, has become one of the most concerned economics research topics. Economy-seeking has always been a phenomenon of inefficiency in allocating Socio-economic resources. With the existence of power vacuum and so called “Public domain” in the socialist market economy, “rent” from the power, luring the main socio-economic to grab it by consuming all kinds of resources, harming the interests of others at the same time and creating a non-equity community wealth transfer. Accounting, as a means of allocating Socio-economic resources, could lead to non-productive transfer of social wealth, and with its operational features of directing economic consequences, different accounting information is often bring different effects on the company, while Chinas accounting standard aimed at better resource-allocation has enacted through the political process, in which it is difficult to achieve absolute fairness. Thus the one can obtain “public rent” in the process of allocating social-economic resources as long as he or she can impose favorable influence to accounting rules. As a result some stakeholders will be harmed and some will be benefited. Such accounting practices reflect the rent-seeking thinking of modern economics. With the development of accounting policy’s market-oriented reform, the government has gradually reduced direct intervention to economy and effort to develop market mainstay, incremental economic benefits of enterprises and individual stakeholders has related to its ability to innovate gradually. At the same time, inherent flaws in a high degree of unified accounting system has gradually exposed, and the government has gradually come to realize the drawbacks of the original