关于“品牌”方面的外文文献.docVIP

外文翻译 外文翻译 原文1 Supply chain interactions due to store-brand introductions: The impact of retail competition Store-brand products are of increasing importance in retailing, often causing channel conflict as they compete with national brands. Focusing on the interactions that arise in single-manufacturer single-retailer settings, previous research suggests that one main driver of store-brand profitability to the retailer is that it leads to a reduction of the national-brand wholesale price. Under retail competition, the Robinson Patman Act then introduces an interesting trade-off: A retailer that introduces a store brand incurs the associated costs and risks, while sharing this benefit with its competition. We show that the resulting interactions can cause retailers to play “chicken”, either of them preferring a store-brand introduction by the competitor. Such interactions do not arise in channels with a single retailer, as has been the object of most previous research, and we show that some of the key insights derived from single-retailer models fail to hold when retailers compete. We conduct a numeric study, and our findings suggest that retailers are more likely to randomize their store-brand introduction strategies when customers have strong store preferences, and when the retailers’ store-brand products are similar to the national-brand product in terms of customer valuations and production cost. Intuition suggests that the introduction of store brands increases the retailers’ power in the supply chain and that the manufacturer needs to reduce the wholesale price to sustain national-brand sales. Assuming that this intuition holds and that this wholesale price reduction is one of the key drivers of store-brand profitability, the legislation associated with the Robinson Patman Act introduces an interesting trade-off into the retailers’ decision making. Since the act requires that the manufacturer charges the same wholesale price to all retailers (unless there is a g