代理成本视角下大股东掏空的动机研究——以正和股份为例.docVIP

PAGE PAGE 21 代理成本视角下大股东掏空的动机研究 ——以正和股份为例 摘要：现代公司治理主要存在两类代理成本，一类是以往学者研究的重点，即上市公司股东与管理者之间的代理成本。近来的研究发现，在大多数股权相当集中的国家，产生了另一种代理成本，拥有绝对控股权的大股东利用其对公司的控制权通过各种方式为自己攫取私利，掏空上市公司，侵害中小股东的合法利益。大股东与中小股东间的代理冲突日益激烈。我国政府出台了各种措施保护中小股东的利益，但是我国资本市场发展不成熟，公司治理机制和市场监管制度都存在许多问题，大股东掏空上市公司的现象依然存在。大股东产生掏空动机是由其主观目的和社会客观条件共同形成。关于从代理成本视角下的大股东掏空动机研究将在以往学者的研究基础上结合案例致力于找出促成大股东掏空行为产生的因素，即找到公司大股东掏空的主观目的和大股东能够实现掏空的客观条件。 2013年媒体报道正和股份大股东涉嫌掏空公司资产，经相关部门核查，大股东陈隆基通过其对公司的控制权将子公司北京正和鸿远置业有限公司的股权全部转让给由自己全权控制的公司，套取了正和股份大量资金，严重侵害了其他中小股东的利益。此次研究将通过正和股份的案例，从大股东主观目的和客观社会条件即大股东减持制度、股权集中度、公司治理结构及市场监管制度方面分析大股东掏空的动机。 关键词：大股东、代理成本、掏空、动机 Study on the Motivation of Major Stock Holder’s Tunneling from the Perspective of Agency Costs —Take HAINAN ZHENGHE INDL GRP CO,LT as an Example Abstract: There are two kinds of agency costs in the management of the Modern Corporation. One is the agency costs between the companys major stock holder and the managers which is the focus of the previous studies. A recent study found that there was another agency cost in most countries that has quite concentrated ownership. Major stock holder would use their control of the company to seek their own interests through a variety of ways and tunneling the listing Corporation. Which infringe the legitimate rights and interests of small shareholders.?The conflict between major stock holder and small stock holders has been increasingly fierce.?Government has introduced various measures to protect the interests of small and medium stock holders The development of Chinese capital market is not mature, the mechanism of corporate governance and market supervision system have many problems, the phenomenon of major stock holder tunnel of the listing Corporation still exists. major stock holder tunneling motivation is formed by the subjective and social objective conditions. Study on tunneling motivation of big shareholders from the perspective of agency costs which combined the basis of previous scholars with the case would committee to identifying th