博弈论教程教学文件 麦晓婷拥挤.pptVIP

* A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks André de Palma The American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (May, 1992) Presented by Mai Xiaoting A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks Introduction A lot of time is lost due to traffic congestion Construction of highways and conventional toll pricing appear financially or politically difficult One alternative: the provision of congestion-related information to users These projects are usually costly and their scope is limited Question: Should there be provision of congestion-related information ? A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks Contributions Contrary to the general belief among transportation experts, more information is not necessarily better This study shows that there is a whole range of situations for which perfect or selective information is welfare-decreasing A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks III II I IV V Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum Gain (vs. Loss) from Perfect Information Gain (vs. Loss) from Selective Information Private-Road Pricing Conclusions A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum III II I IV V O2 O1 D2 D1 a A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks b c d Assumptions discrete departures occurs at the same time it takes one period of time to cross one link total costs=fixed cost+congestion cost Consider In this section all parameters are assumed to be fixed and known by the drivers III II I IV V e.g. for the left route corresponding to O1-D1 , O2 O1 D2 D1 a A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of Simple Congested Networks b c d III II I IV V Assumptions (Cont.) assume that a and c are large enough so that the drivers going from O1 to D2 and from O2 to D1 take the “direct” paths the analysis can be restr