21外部性的私人对策：科斯定理.pptVIP

外部性的私人对策：科斯定理 武汉大学 赵 伟 * Private responses Coase theorem Mergers Social conventions * Coase Theorem Insight: root of the inefficiencies from externalities is the absence of property rights. The Coase Theorem states that once property rights are established and transaction costs are small, then one of the parties will bribe the other to attain the socially efficient quantity. The socially efficient quantity is attained regardless of whom the property rights were initially assigned.社会效率产量的取得与初始产权配置格局无关。 * Illustration of the Coase Theorem Recall the steel firm / fishery example. If the steel firm was assigned property rights, it would initially produce Q1, which maximizes its profits. If the fishery was assigned property rights, it would initially mandate zero production, which minimizes its damages. Figure 5.3 钢厂削减产量的机会成本是MB-MPC；削减产量后渔场的收益是MD的减少。 Q1-1 * Coase Theorem – assign property rights to steel firm Consider the effects of the steel firm reducing production in the direction of the socially efficient level, Q*. This entails a cost to the steel firm and a benefit to the fishery: The steel firm (and its customers) would lose surplus between the MB and MPC curves between Q1 and Q1-1, while the fishery’s damages are reduced by the area under the MD curve between Q1 and Q1-1. Note that the marginal loss in profits is extremely small, because the steel firm was profit maximizing, while the reduction in damages to the fishery is substantial. A bribe from the fishery to the steel firm could therefore make all parties better off. * Coase Theorem – assign property rights to steel firm When would the process of bribes (and pollution reduction) stop? When the parties no longer find it beneficial to bribe. The fishery will not offer a bribe larger than it’s MD for a given quantity, and the steel firm will not accept a bribe smaller than its loss in profits (MB-MPC) for a given quantity. Thus, the quantity where MD=(MB-MPC) will be where the parties stop bribing and r