上市公司最终控制人对绩效的影响研究.pdfVIP

上市公司最终控制人对绩效的影响研究 赖建清 吴世农 厦门大学管理学院(361005) lailai100@ 摘要：本文主要从两个方面考察了上市公司最终控制人与经营绩效之间的关系： 现金流量权与控制权的偏离程度、占据的董事席位比例与控股比例的偏离程度。 通过分析沪深股市 2002 年 1085 家上市公司，我们得到两个重要结论：第一，最 终控制人的现金流量权与控制权的偏离程度不影响公司绩效，这一结论与国外的 实证研究明显不一致；第二，最终控制人在董事会中占据的董事席位比例越超过 其控股比例，公司绩效越低。本文的研究结论说明，我国上市公司的最终控制人 主要利用股权分置现象侵害外部股东的利益，而不像其他国家上市公司的控制人 采用复杂的控股结构进行利益输送，同时最终控制人通过向董事会派出超出自身 持股比例的代表以控制董事会，从而达到牟取自身私利的目的。最后作者认为， 即使解决全流通问题之后，最终控制人占据过多董事席位的问题可能依然存在， 分离现金流量权与控制权所导致的负面效应也可能替代股权分置效应，因此最终 控制人侵害外部投资者利益的行为未必能够得到有效遏制。 关键词：最终控制人 股权结构 董事会 公司绩效 A Study on the Relationship between Ultimate Owners and Corporate Performance Jianqing Lai and Shinong Wu School of Management, Xiamen University, China (361005) lailai100@ Abstract: In this paper we study the relationship between ultimate owners and corporate performance in China’s stock market. After analyzing the data of 1085 listed companies in 2002, we can draw two significant conclusions: at first, whether ultimate owners use pyramids to separate voting rights and cash flow rights or not, and not matter how much their voting rights exceed cash flow rights, Corporate performance seems not be significantly different. This result is inconsistent with some empirical paper in the world. Secondly, more representatives are sent into boards by ultimate owners, worse will the performance of companies become. We infer that as long as ultimate owners possess large amounts of non-tradable and low cost stock, they will make use of separated stock market to seek for private benefit instead of sophisticated pyramidal structure. Furthermore, these ultimate owners would like to