领导干部经济责任审计质量保证机制研究.pdfVIP

摘要 领导干部经济责任审计制度已经在我国实施了 20 多年，期间取得了不俗的成效，其 作为我国审计监督的重要组成部分，对促进和完善我国的公共治理有着重要的作用。但现 实是，经济责任审计仍然存在着诸多未解决的问题，总的来说审计质量并非处于高水平， 导致该审计模式未能完全发挥其理论上的功能。 本文以审计环境、审计风险和审计资源为切入点，结合相关实例详细分析了经济责任 审计现存的影响审计质量的问题：第一，经济责任审计环境的不完善；第二，经济责任审 计风险的偏高；第三，经济责任审计资源配置和利用的不合理。针对这些问题，本文提出 了相关政策建议。首先，从博弈角度论证了加强经济责任审计质量监督的必要性，为具体 的政策建议提供理论支撑；接着，提出经济责任审计质量保证机制的具体政策建议，主要 分为两大部分，一是基于宏观层面的经济责任审计质量保证机制，二是基于微观层面的经 济责任审计质量保证机制；最后，提出经济责任审计改革的长远设想：要保证和提高经济 责任审计质量，必须彻底改革经济责任审计体制，具体做法是把经济责任审计从现行审计 体制中剥离出来，重构经济责任审计主体，确立经济责任审计的地位，并最终实现经济责 任审计的“去行政化”。 关键词： 经济责任审计 质量保证 机制 I ABSTRACT The system of economic responsibility audit of leading cadres has been implemented for 20 years in China. In this period, the system was effective. As an important part of the audit supervision mechanism, it played an important role in public governance. However, there are still many unresolved issues for the economic responsibility audit, the overall audit quality of which is not at a high level, cause that the system has not fully play its theoretical capability. In this paper, the audit environment, the audit risk and the audit resources are the entry point. Basing on a detailed analysis of one relevant example of economic responsibility audit, this paper pointed out the existing issues of audit quality. First, the environment of economic responsibility audit is imperfect; second, the risk of economic responsibility audit is at a high level; third, the assignment of economic responsibility audit resources is unreasonable. To solve these problems, this paper put forward some policy recommendations. First of all, this paper demonstrated that the possibility of the audit quality supervision by game theory, which provided theoret