领导权结构决定因素与经济后果.pdfVIP

摘 要 本文从我国的制度和政策背景出发，以我国证券市场上 1995-2006 年间 11004 个公司年为样本，对领导权结构决定因素和经济后果进行了研究。关于领 导权结构决定因素，本文研究表明我国企业的领导权结构由公司外部政策和公司 内部特征的共同决定。两职合一与外部的两职分离政策显著负相关，与公司信息 不对称程度和总经理能力都显著正相关。关于领导权结构经济后果，本文发现在 没有外部政策影响的情况下，公司绩效与两职合一不存在显著的相关关系；而在 有政策要求两职分离的情况下，公司绩效与两职合一存在显著的正相关关系。这 说明政府政策打破了原有的企业根据自身特征做出最优经济决策的平衡状态，强 制要求企业将两职分离实际上并不利于优化公司治理结构和提高企业绩效。 关键词：领导权结构，决定因素，经济后果，规制政策 Abstract Based on the institutional and regulatory background of China, this paper uses the sample of 11,004 firm-years from the securities market of China during 1995 to 2006 to examine the determinants and consequences of corporate leadership structure. According to the results of this paper, the leadership structure is determined by both external and internal factors. Dual leadership (two positions combined) is negatively related to the regulatory policy and positively related to the information asymmetry in the firm and CEO ability. As for the consequences of leadership structure, when no external regulation exists, there is no significant relationship between corporate performance and dual leadership. But when external regulation requires separating the two roles, there is a significant positive relationship between corporate performance and dual leadership. This shows that the regulatory policy of the government breaks the equilibrium of firms to make optimal economic decisions according to their own characteristics. Forcing firms to separate the two roles of board chairman and CEO is not beneficial for the optimization of governance struct