监管机构的特别兴趣分析区域渔业管理外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 This article tests capture theory by analyzing voting behavior on U.S. Regional Fishery Management Councils. Some seats on the councils are reserved for state and federal agency representatives; others, for political appointees. The political appointees primarily represent special interests (specifically, commercial and recreational fishing interests); a smaller number of appointees represent public interests. We use logistic regression to model the vote of state and federal agency representatives on the councils as a function of the votes of commercial interests, recreational interests, and public interests. We find evidence that some state agencies are captured by special interests from their states, but not systematic evidence across all states. We find that state agency representatives voted with commercial interests from their own state in five of the sixteen states in our sample; with recreational interests in three states; and with both special interests in two states. These ten states support the capture hypothesis; the other six states do not. We find no evidence that federal agencies were captured on the councils. We conclude that the gubernatorial-driven appointment process leads to capture at the state level by promoting voting blocs among state agency representatives and special interests from those states. Federal agency representatives, by contrast, are better able to maintain their distance from state-level politics on the councils, and thereby enhance their ability to vote independently on fishery management measures. KEY WORDS: agency capture, regulatory policy, natural resource management, marine fisheries policy, Regional Fishery Management Councils We analyze voting behavior on four of the eight U.S. Regional Fishery Management Councils to test hypotheses from capture theory. The councils make regulatory recommendations on a variety of marine fisheries issues within the Economic Exclusion Zone (i.e., along the entire U.S. coastline, from 3