奎因对模态逻辑的批评.pdfVIP

Studiesin Logic,Vol.7,No.1(2014): 62–83 PII:1674-3202(2014)-01-0062-22 * Quine’sCriticisms of Modal Logic EdwardBecker DepartmentofPhilosophy,University of Nebraska-Lincoln ebecker1@unl.edu Abstract. Quine’svariousobjectionstomodallogicinclude: (i)sincemodalcontextsareref- erentially opaque, quantification into them does not make sense; (ii) our empirical knowledge of some necessary truths is incompatible with a linguistic theory of necessity; (iii) quantifi- cation into modal contexts commits us to “Aristotelian essentialism.” Among Quine’s critics are Church, Kripke and Føllesdal. The latter argues that modal constructions should be treated as extensionally opaque and referentially transparent. The Quinean criticism appealing to the referential opacity of modal contexts is shown to break down for modal logics not employing singularterms. Hisobjectiontoessentialismisthatitintroducesakindofnecessitythatcannot beexplainedinlinguisticterms. Followingadiscussionoftheuseofnamesinlanguage,wesee that empirical knowledge of the truth values of identities involving names is compatible with a priori knowledge of what Casullo calls their “general modal status.” Given Quine’s demon- stration that the necessary truth of true identities is a truth of logic, and given that all truths of logic follow from a Davidson style theory of meaning (argued elsewhere), it can be seen that wecangivealinguistictheoryofouraprioriknowledgeofthemodalstatusoftruestatements ofidentity involving names. Modal logic is the logic of the modalities, necessity, possibility, impossibility, etc. Since its founding in its modern form by C. I. Lewis, it has been continuously studied and developed, and is now a