自由意志、可供取舍的可能性及其法兰克福式反例.doc

自由意志、可供取舍的可能性及法兰克福式反例 【摘要】 本文旨在检视两个针对哈里·法兰克福(Harry Frankfurt)在 1969 年所发表的论文 中提及到的例子，即一般被后来的论者称之为法兰克福式反例 (Frankfurt-style counterexamples, FSC)所提出的论证，这一类例子旨在反驳自由意志的一个必要 条件是可供取舍的可能性 (alternative possibilities as the necessary condition of free will)。 第一个论证是所谓的自由的闪烁论证(Flickers of Freedom strategy)。闪烁的自由 论证旨在这类反例中找寻可供取舍的可能性(alternative possibilities)，从而使得 FSC 不能符合例子的描述，即没有可供取舍的可能性而仍然有自由意志及道德责 任。 第二个是所谓的两难论证(Dilemma Defense)，两难论证使得法兰克福式反例跌入 一个两难局面。在第一端的论证，如果假定决定论为真，就会被不相容论者认为 犯了乞题(begging the question)的谬误；在第二端，如果非决定论为真，那么行动 者总是有可供取舍的可能性，而行动者因此仍然有自由意志及道德责任。 然而笔者认为这两个论证各有问题：闪烁的自由论证遭到了所谓强健性 (robutness)要求的攻击，强健性要求即只有在道德上相关及重要的那些可供取舍 的可能性才应该被考虑，这要求亦非常符合我们对自由意志的直观；两难论证当 中第一端需要与强健性要求一起看，这样我们就可以看清楚对哪些是决定论对自 由意志造成的阻碍而哪些是别的因素对它造成的阻碍；两难论证的第二端所假设 的抢先(preemption)未必是必要条件，而且，存在另外一种抢先使得 FSC 在概念 上依然是融贯的。 【关键词】  自由意志  道德责任  法兰克福式反例 两难论证  自由的闪烁策略 Free Will, Alternative Possibilities and Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples Kwok Chi Ming, Department of Philosophy, Major in Ethics Directed by Professor Xu Xiangdong 【Abstract】 This thesis aims to evaluate two arguments which were being raised to object the case given by Harry Frankfurt in his very famous article in 1969. The example is usually been called Frankfurt-Style Counterexample (FSC), which is to argue against alternative possibilities as the necessary condition of free will. The first argument is called Flickers of Freedom strategy. Flickers of Freedom strategy targets at finding alternative possibilities in FSCs, which makes FSC not fulfilling its own criteria of no alternative possibilities found in all cases. If alternatives is found, then the agent will still has free will and moral responsibility. The second argument against FSC is called Dilemma Defense. Dilemma Defense argues that FSC is facing a dilemma that makes itself inappropriate to hold. In the first horn of the argument, if determinism is assumed to be true, then it will commit the fallacy of begging the question against the incompatibilist. In the second horn of the