环境污染问题演化博弈分析卢方元.pdfVIP

2007 年9 月 系统工程理论与实践 第9 期 : 100026788(2007) 0920148205 环境污染问题的演化博弈分析 卢方元 ( 郑州大学商学 , 郑州 450001) : 用演化博弈论的方法对产污企业之间、环保部门和产污企业之间相互作用时的策略选择行为进 行分析. 结果表明: 当产污企业不处理污染物的收益大于处理污染物的收益、环保部门对不处理污染物 的企业处罚力度过轻或对产污企业进行监测的成本过高时, 环境污染必然发生. 要确保环境不被严重污 染, 就必须对不处理污染物的企业进行严惩, 降低不处理污染物的预期收益. 同时, 要加强环保队伍建 设, 严格执法, 加大对环保的投入, 减少监测成本. : 环境污染; 复制动态; 演化博弈; 演化稳定策略 : F22 : A Evolutionary Game Analy i on Environmental Pollution Problem LU Fang2yuan (Bu ine School, Zhengzhou Univer ity, Zhengzhou 450001, China) Abstr act : Analyzing the trategie . choice on the interaction among the producing pollution. enterpri e , between the environmental protection department and the producing pollution. enterpri e with the evolutionary game theory. The re ult how that when the payoff for dealing with the wa te re idue of the producing pollution. enterpri e i larger than not, or the puni hment on the enterpri e who don. t deal with the pollutant i too light, or the monitoring co t of the environmental protection department i too large, then environment pollution i inevitable. Puni hing the enterpri e who don. t deal with the pollutant and reducing their expected payoff to make ure the environment won. t be everely polluted. At the ame time, we hould trengthen the environmental protection per onnel, trictly enforce the law, increa e it input, and reduce the monitoring co t. Key wor ds : environmental pollution ; duplicative dynamic; evolutionary game; evolutionary table trategy 1 保护和改善生活环境和生态环境, 防治污染和自然