股权分置改革前后高管持股和公司业绩相关性比较研究.pdfVIP

长期业绩与股价的联系，使高管付出和收益关系更紧密；第三，完善我 国高管股权激励制度，发展多种形式的股权激励，提高高管股权激励的 灵活性和效果。 关键词：高管持股，公司业绩，公司市场价值，股权分置改革 CORRELATION COMPARISON OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE BETWEEN BEFORE AND AFTER NON-TRADABLE SHARES REFORM ABSTRACT There was no consensus of whether or not managerial ownership could solve or ease principal-agent problem which rises from separation of ownership and management rights. As China’s not-tradable shares reform is completing, the contradictions between tradable shareholders and will be solved, and principal-agent problem between shareholders and management become more noticeable, so solutions are in hurry needed. And also, the government issued stock incentive management regulations to set rules and encourage listed companies to grant stock to their top management, and we believe that the purpose is to ease principal-agent problem. So, this paper will use China A share listed companies’ 2003, 2004 and 2006 data as sample, and use regression model, to analyze the effect of managerial ownership in two different methods. First, compare the correlation between before and after non-tradable shares reform, and the result is no significant growth. Second, test the correlation between management ownership and market value, and the result is also non-significant. There are four major reasons why correlation between management ownership and company performance and market value are not significant even after the reform. First, China corporate governance is not so good that decrease the effect of managerial ownership; second, managerial ownership is too low to incentive management; third, in early days, company