国有企业公司治理机制的研究.pdf

国有企业公司治理机制研究 Abstract Corporate governance is regarded as the core of the modern enterprise system, and it is the emphasis of our enterprise practice of reform. In the modem corporate governance system, the diversification and scattering of the ownership of shares is one of its main characteristics. Multi-level principal--agency systems among share holder meeting, board of directors and managers realize the separation between ownership and actual control power. Because in principal-agency systems, it always exists information asymmetric problem between client and agent, further more，in Chinese corporate governance system the phenomenon of the “an only big shareholder is a common sight, and for the reason of imperfection of the mechanism of superintendence and restriction, so the opportunism moral risk and internal person control phenomenon caused by the “an only big shareholder” are very dangerous . The paper based on the practical and theoretical background, take corporate governance system of state-owned enterprises as the object of study, had a rigorous analysis from theory to demonstration. This text goes deep into expatiating the core theory of modern corporate governance: property rights theory and principal-agency theory. Combining Chinese actual circumstance and foreign experience and failure, researches how to improve the operating efficiency of corporate power organ and the overall efficiency of corporate governance. So it has high applicability. But, we should be well in consideration of state