政府干预下的掠夺和政治关联研究.pdfVIP

权与现金流量权的分离随着公司政治关联强度的增加而增加。所以，我们的实证检 验结果表明，政治关联会加剧控股股东的代理问题。 关键词：政府干预; 政治关联; 并购; 掠夺 II Abstract Government intervention will lead to two economic phenomena: one is the prevalence of “the grabbing hand” of government; the other is the prevalence of political connection. However, there are only a few direct empirical evidences on the channels of “the grabbing hand”. One purpose of this paper is thus to provide direct empirical evidence on the channels of “the grabbing hand” with mergers. In addition, the extant literature does not examine the relationship between political connection and expropriation by the controlling shareholder. Thus the other purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between political connection and expropriation by the controlling shareholder, and provide the corresponding empirical evidence. Using a sample of 227 mergers with local government-controlled acquirers and unlisted target firms from 2001 to 2005, we examine the effects of government intervention and political connections on the announcement abnormal returns of local government-controlled acquirers. We find that local government-controlled acquirers get negative abnormal returns, which is contrary to the theoretical prediction and the empirical result of the extant literature in the West. Further evidence shows that the difference of the result between this paper and the extant literature in the West results from the fact that the local government has strong incentives to intervene on the merger activities of local government-controlled firms to achieve h