defending the purely instrumental strongaccountstrong of democratic.pdfVIP

1 Debate: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy Richard J. Arneson Governments compel their subjects to obey laws and duly empowered commands of public officials. Under what circumstances is this coercion by governments morally legitimate? In the contemporary world, many say a legitimate government must be democratic, and, with qualifications, I agree. (Let us say that in a democracy all nontransient adult residents are eligible to be citizens and each citizen if free to vote and run for office in free elections that determine who shall be lawmakers and top public officials.) More controversially, I hold that what renders the democratic form of government for a nation morally legitimate (when it is) is that its operation over time produces better consequences for people than any feasible alternative mode of governance. Christopher Griffin criticizes this purely instrumental account of the justification of democracy.1 His target is a 1993 essay by me that outlines a version of this approach.2 He also offers a brief sketch of an alternative line of argument to the conclusion that democratic government is uniquely morally legitimate. I welcome the stimulus to revisit this large and significant topic provided by Griffin’s interesting arguments. Griffin develops two arguments against my line on democracy. I shall argue that one of his arguments misfires and the other one, though it correctly challenges a genuinely confused train of thought, is not well aimed at any argument I ever advanced or have any interest in 2 advancing. The end result is that the purely instrum