产业组织chapter4产品差异化研讨.pptVIP

Measuring the degree of product differentiation and the cross-price effect/own-price effect §3 Location Models under horizontal differentiation Hotelling model 1、Price game with fixed location(linear transportation cost) consumers reside on a linear street with a length of 1. Suppose they are uniformly distributed on this interval,each consumer is indexed by there is a monopoly selling identical products, each consumor has reservation price V. which is the location where it is sold? The maximum price a consumer can afford is: The demand function for monopoly: The profit function for monopoly: By analogy,if the monopoly increases the number of shops , then Optimal n for the monopoly: Optimal n for social welfare It implies that the firms prefer to excessive differentiation(too much brands) 2.Comparison:if the monopoly just covers a part of the interval Assumption that shop i sells identifical products to the consumers who are in distance r. It implies that (1)if π(n)π*,the monopoly meets all demand (2)ifπ(n)π*, the monopoly meets a part of demand 4.Precise conditions for NE existence given linear transportation cost (D’Aspremont) When firm i cuts price unilaterally two firms exist simultaneously if ： two firms get optimal prices simultaneously if ： Reviewing the conclusion in Hotelling model If the location of two firms is symmetrical absolutely，then a=b≤l/4 If two firms move toward the center,their profits increase. Thus NE (p1N,P2N) in Hotelling model doesnt exist. 第二期: 在给定参数a和b的情况下，寻找 NE NE： 第1期 根据企业的利润最大化，分别寻找最优a和b（即企业的最优定位） SPE：a=b=0 企业将遵循最大化差异原则。 策略效应将大于直接效应，导致企业尽可能选择差异化的产品 进一步地，如果有多种产品，差异化定位问题更加复杂。假定3种产品，成本为c，二次交通成本 2的均衡定位的将无法确定，除非考虑相邻产品的价格。 三、The circular approach 假定潜在进入者除了固定成本F外没有其他进入壁垒。消费者均匀分布在周长为1的圆形城市，企业也沿圆周分布，每个位置只有1家企业，每家企业的成本为c Stage1:决定是否进入从而决定n Stage2:进行价格竞争 其中一家企业i面临的消费需求x∈(0,1/n) 如果市场进入完全自由，0利润条件下的进入数量为： 相应地， 企业的最优数量(从社会角度) 说明市场上存在过多的企业或品牌，即过度差异化，导致资源浪费 影响差异最大化或差异最小化的因素