中财-微观经济学-第八章-利润最大化和竞争性供给.ppt

本章概要 竞争市场利润最大化与均衡 1.1厂商追求利润最大化的假设 2.1完全竞争市场的定义 证明 3.1.分析框架：数学解 3.2.分析框架：几何解 4.1.短期均衡MR=MC 关于短期均衡的总结 4.2.1由短期均衡的五种情形可推导出完全竞争厂商的短期供给线：几何 4.2.2由短期均衡的五种情形可推导出完全竞争厂商的短期供给线：数学 生产者剩余与经济利润的区别 市场的生产者剩余 4.4.1从长期利润最大化到长期均衡 4.4.2从长期利润最大化到长期均衡 4.5行业的长期供给曲线 Press Release 12 October 2009 Economic governance: the organization of cooperation Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user associations. Oliver Williamson has developed a theory where business firms serve as structures for conflict resolution. Over the last three decades these seminal contributions have advanced economic governance research from the fringe to the forefront of scientific attention. Economic transactions take place not only in markets, but also within firms, associations, households, and agencies. Whereas economic theory has comprehensively illuminated the virtues and limitations of markets, it has traditionally paid less attention to other institutional arrangements. The research of Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson demonstrates that economic analysis can shed light on most forms of social organization. Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote successful outcomes. Oliver Williamson has argued that markets and hierarchical organizations, such as firms, represent alternative governance structures which differ in their approaches to resolving conflicts of interest. The drawback of markets is th