机构投机者地理位置对公司监控的影响.docVIP

机构投机者地理位置对公司监控的影响 　　摘要： 随着会计和金融研究的不断加深，地理相近的经济效益已被证实，公司和股东之间的沟通也越来越多，两者之间的物理距离远近会使互动成本和频率有很大差别。机构投资者是投资专业化、组织化和社会化的产物，是市场经济发展到一定程度的必然趋势，其投资策略及行为会对市场造成较大的影响。以前的会计研究较少关注机构投资者地理临近对企业内部治理、盈利能力的影响。在本文中，我们研究地理临近是否会影响机构股东对公司的治理。结果表明当地股东较多的企业有更好的内部治理机制且盈利能力更强。地方性金融机构的监测效果将对公司治理产生显著作用，特别是当其他形式的治理薄弱的情况下。我们发现一般在高浓度的国内机构投资者中，公司有更好的内部治理和更强的盈利能力。这些公司也不太可能进行如积极的盈余管理或期权回溯等不良的企业活动，也不太可能的集体诉讼的目标。进而，这些企业的管理者在参与风险巨大的项目时表现出较低的倾向，也不太可能参与毫无风险的项目。考察当地企业的监控机制，我们发现当地机构投资者更容易采纳股东提议，增加CEO营业额，减少CEO多余的薪酬。 　　Abstract： With the continuous deepening of accounting and finance research， the economic benefits of geographical proximity have been confirmed， the communication between the company and the shareholders is increasing and the physical distance between the two will make the interaction between the cost and frequency vary greatly. Institutional investors are the result of the specialization， organization and socialization of investment. It is the inevitable trend of the development of the market economy to a certain extent， and its investment strategy and behavior will have a greater impact on the market. Previous accounting studies are less concerned about the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance and profitability. In this paper， we study whether geographic proximity affects the governance of institutional shareholders in the company. The results show that the local shareholders have better internal governance mechanisms and stronger profitability. The monitoring effect of local financial institutions will have a significant effect on corporate governance， especially when other forms of governance are weak. We find that the company has better internal governance and stronger profitability in high concentrations of domestic institutional investors. These companies are also unlikely to carry out such as aggressive earnings management or option back and other undesirable enterprise activities， it is unlikely the target of collective action. And then， the managers of the