國際會計準則暨資訊不對稱、公司治理對會計資訊品質的.PDFVIP

2011 TOPCO 崇越論文大賞 論文題目 : 國際會計準則暨資訊不對稱、公司治理對 會計資訊品質的影響：中國大陸資本市場 A 、B 之實證研究 報名編號： B0057 摘 要 本研究主要目的在於探討不同的會計準則下，資訊不對稱、股權結構以及董 監事股權質押 情況等，分別對會計資訊品質的影響。本研究實證結果發現，首先， 採用國際會計準則可提升預測價值及時效性，但增加忠實表達 之效果不顯著。其 次，資訊不對稱會降低會計資訊品質，而採用國際會計準則能降低資訊不對稱的 負面效果，但其進而提升會計資訊品質的效果有限。第三，國有股、高階管理人 與大股東及董監事等持股確實會降低會計資訊品質，在採用國際會計準則下，可 抑制國有股、高階管理人與大股東及董監事持股之負面效果，但僅對預測價值及 時效性之提昇有顯著作用。最後，董監事股權質押情形會降低會計資訊品質，且 採用國際會計準則可抑制董監事股權質押之負面效果，但進而提升會計資訊品質 的效果不顯著。 關鍵字：國際會計準則、資訊不對稱、公司治理、會計資訊品質 Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between the information asymmetry, the ownership structure, the pledge of directors-supervisor, respectively, and the quality of accounting information under different accounting standards. First, we find that IFRS improves the predictive value and timeliness, and it can’t influences representational faithfulness significantly. But using IFRS will enhance the opportunity of earning management and decrease neutrality. Second, the information asymmetry degrades the quality of accounting information. Nevertheless, IFRS can improve the information asymmetry but promote the quality of accounting information is nonsignificantly. Third, state ownership, manager ownership, blockholder and directors-supervisor ownership would affect the quality of accounting information. IFRS would restrain negative effect of state ownership, manager ownership, blockholder and directors-supervisor ownership and could enhance predictive value, timeliness and neutrality. Finally, the pledge of directors-supervisor would reduce the quality of accounting information. However, IFRS can confine negative effects of the pledge of directors-supervisor b