契约理论讲义4：逆向选择1.pdf

Lecture on Contract Theory 2. Complete Contracts I: Static Bilateral Contracting Huihua NIE School of Economics Renmin University of China www.ChinaES. niehuihua(at) 2.3 Adverse Selection I: Screening 2.3.1 Typical case: lemon market Chinese idiom: 滥竽充数; Akerlof (1970), and Mirrlees (1971) formally analyzed the problem of hidden information. Timing: Ex ante adverse selection t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 time N decides P design A accepts contract state contract or rejects implements Fig. 1-3  What’s the type of this game theory, static game with imperfect information or dynamic game with imperfect information? Beyesian equilibrium: if *  *  p (a ,, )   p (a ,, ) , agents will choose a . i i i i i i i i i 2.3.2 Basic model: nonlinear pricing Consider a transaction between a buyer (customer) and a seller (Telcom), where the seller doesn’t know perfectly how much the buyer is willing to pay for his good. Actually it is a problem of “second-degree price discrimination”. And “all competition is discriminatory” (Alchian-Allen, 1972).  The buyer’s preferences is u(q,T ,) u(q) T , where u(0) 0 , u (q) 0 , and  u (q) 0 .  { , } is private information for