宏观调控中地方政府与中央政府博弈的法律分析.pdfVIP

第 31 卷第 5 期 兰州文理学院学报(社会科学版〉 Vol. 31.No. 5 2015 年 9 月 Journal of Lanzhou University of Arts and Science (Social Sciences) Sept. 2015 宏观调控中地方政府与中央政府 博弈的法律分析 (福建师范大学法学院，福建福州 E摘 要】中央政府的宏观调控在很大程度上需要依赖地方政府的配合与执行，但是在实际的施行过程 中，却常常存在地方政府与中央政府进行博弈的现象。地方政府与中央政府的博弈虽然并非全无益处，但是 缺乏法律规制的博弈会产生削弱宏观调控的实际效果、降低政府宏观调控的可信性等不良后果。地方政府与 中央政府博弈法律上的原因主要在于事权与财权配置不合理、程序性规范不足、缺乏有效的监督问责机制等。 因此，应当建立和完善规范宏观调控中地方政府与中央政府博弈的规则z 如完善分税制、明确中央与地方政府 的事权并使之与财权相匹配，建立有效的监督、问责机制，健全宏观调控程序法律制度等，使地方政府与中央 政府的博弈法律化、并形成良性循环。 E关 键 词】宏观调控;地方政府与中央政府;博弈F 法律分析:制度完善 E 中图分类号】 DF38 [文献标识码1 A [文章编号】 2095-7009(2015)05-0042-07 Legal Analysis on the Game between Central and Local Governments in Macro-control ZHANG Ying (Schoolof Law. Fujian Normal University. Fuzhou 350117. China) Abslracl: The macro-control policy could not be executed effectively without the help of local governments. But there ex- ists the game between local government and central government in the practice. Though there are some benefits in the game between central and local government. the illegal game would weaken the actual effect of the macro-control and re- duce the credibility of the macro-control policy. The main legal reasons of the game between central and local government is that the division of the ownership of property and duties between the central and local government is unreasonable. pro- cedural norms is insufficient in the macro-controllaw system. and the restriction mechanism of supervision and accounta- bility system are inefficient. Therefore. it should establish and perfect rules to the game between the local governments and central government: