有限理性视角下区域内地方政府博弈行为的演化与稳定.pdfVIP

Vol. 29. No. 4 第29 fí;第4 期 大连理工大学学报(社会科学版) Journal of Dalian University of Technolo韧 (Social Scienc创) Dec.2008 2008 年 12 月 有限理性视角下区域内地方政府博弈行为的演化与稳定 罗正清1 ，温博慧2 ( 1.天津大学管理学院，天津 300072; 2. 天津财组大学经济学院，天津 300222 ) 摘 要:文章从有限理性视角出发，运用演化博弈玻伦对区域内地方政府间的博界行为进行分析。研究发现，1监外 部条件既定的情况下.区就内向质、异质地方欢府的博界存在各自不同的演化路径和稳定策略e 并且实现稳定策略的Ji. t盖不是级典博葬理论下的简单线性Ji.径.而是复杂的非线性Ji.径.存在关键性的间位.这意味着.对区域内地方政府间 博弈行为的调节需要依博奔参与者的不同属性和博界的演化路径来进行，并且有效地，调节忍Ji.常在博界的外部求解. 关键词:有限理性f 地方政府p 演化博弈理论p 演化稳定策略 中团分类号: 0625 文献标识码:A 文章编号: 1008-407X(2008)04-0068-05 Analysis of the evolution and stabilization of local governments game behavior in region from a bounded rationality perspective LUO Zheng-qingl , WEN 日o-hui2 ( 1. School of Management. Tia叫in University.γianjin 300072. China; 2. School of Econα羽ics. Tianjin University of Finan佣 and 匠。onαnics. Tianjin 300222. China ) Abstract: ln this paper , local governments game behavior in region is analyzed based on the evolutionary game theory from bounded rationality. The result shows that as external conditions established in the case , there are dífferent evolution paths and stable strategíes in the game of homogeneous and heterogeneous local govern- ments , and that the paths to achieve stable strategies are complex and nonlinear where critícal threshold is re- quired. but not simple and linear under the classical game thωry. It is suggested that local governments game behavior in region should be regulated according to game participants different attributes and evolution paths. Effectíve regulatio