服务未满足情况下的ITO二阶段博弈模型.pdfVIP

河北科技大学学报(社会科学版} Dec. 2012 2012 年 12 月 第 12 卷第 4 期 Journal of Hebei University of Sc ience and Technology( Social Sciences) Vo l. 12 NO.4 文章编号: 1671 - 1653( 2U12)U4 - 1111111 - 07 服务未满足情况下的 ITO 二阶段博弈模型 魏子秋， 路静敏 (河北科技大学经济管理学院，河北 石家庄 U511111H) 摘 要:基于价值链理论、交易费用理论和委托代理理论对信息技术外包(!TÜ)合作的博 弈过程进行探讨.引出 3 个研究问题及相关假设，提出服务来满足情况下的补充服务和终止服 务的假设性前提，并建立与实际更为相符的不同信誉水平的承包商和发包商的两阶段博弈模 型，证明高信誉承包商比低信誉承包商所获收益更多，在博奔过程中更有优势，并在信息对称 和信息不对称的情况下进行模型讨论.得出在这两种情况下发包商的合同策略的区别，根据模 型分析验证相关假设。 关键i司·信息技术外包;二阶段博奔;不对称信息 申图分类号:F49 文献标识码:A 00110. 3969/j. issn. 1671-1653.2012.04.001 Two-stage Game Model of ITO under Dissatisfied Service WEI Zi-qiu. LU ling-min (School of EconomlC~‘ and \1 anagement , Hehei Univers Ll y of Sclence and Technology , Shljiazhuang 05(附lS. Chma) Abstract:ln this paper , the game process of ITO cooperation has been studied based on the value chain theory , transaction C05t theory and principal agent theory. which lead to three research ques tions and relevant assumptions. lt proposed a hypothetical premise of supplementary services and ter mination of service when service is dissatisfied. and built two-stage game models in line with reality including contract providers and contractors of different credibility , 50 a5 to verify that the high credi- bility contractor5 have more advantage in the game process than the low ones , and contract provider5 have different strategies under different conditions of symmetric information and asymmetric informa tion. Finally , all the studies intend to ver