森林保险投保行为博弈分析.pdfVIP

福建农林大学学报{哲学社会科学版) ,2012 , 15(2) :59 -62 Journal of FUJlan Agriculture and Fores町 Universlty (Phllosophy and Social Sciences) 森林保险投保行为博弈分析 冯祥锦1 飞黄和亮1* ，杨建州1 (1.福建农林大学经济与管理学院，福建福州 35侧2; 2. 福建工程学院管理学院，福建福州 350108) [摘要] 兼业农户是南方集体林区主妥林业经营主体和森林保险投保主体之一，具有理性层次低、学习能力弱和模仿成功 策略能力较差的特征。通过构建由较大群体组成，立群体成员之间随机自己对的博弈模型，说明兼业农户之间相互模仿、学 习等动态调整过程，并分析其进化稳定策略，得出结论:(1)博弈均衡的结果及博弈调整的速度不仅与博弈方的理性层次有 关，还与博弈的分布方式有关。 (2) 所有农户都选择投保策略和所有农户都选择不投保策略均为该博弈的进化稳定 策略，各种情况可能性大小取决于森林保险制度的效率。 (3 )基于兼业农户特性和博弈的进化稳定策略，任由兼业农户自 主选择森林保险的制度安排将缺乏效率，需要政府的干预。 [关键词] 森林保险;投保行为:博弈 [中图分类号] F307.2 [文献标识码] A (文章编号] 1671 -6922(2012)但拍59-04 Analysis on the behaviors of forωt insurance coverage FENG Xiang-jin.2 , HUANG He-liang , YANG Jian-zhou ( 1. College 01 Economics and Man唔e1Mnt ， Fujl阳JAgr阳lture and Forestry Uni阳由:y， Fuzhou , Fuji归n 35α阻• China; 2. College 01Manage 1Mnt , Fujian U阻iversity 01 Technology I Fu劝础， Fujian350108 , China) Abstract: Farmer households in part-time operation are main managers of southem collective forestry and the main hodies of forest insurance coverage , wi也 the characteristics of whose rationality level is low 缸td whose shilities of study and simulation of the suc- cessful strategies are 阳，r. A game model is constructed I consisting of a great number of me.曲创with random pa阳ership ， ωillus­ trate a dynamic c∞rdinated process in which the part-time managers simulate and learn each 0也er， and to anal归e its evolutionary stable strategy. Accordingly several conelusions have been obtained 田 follows. (1) The out，∞meof吨uilibrium and the speed of ad- jus田ent not only depend on the rationality level of the players but also depend on the way of distribution of the game. (2) All farm- er hoωeholds selecting 也.e forest insurance and refusing it are evolutionary stable strategy of the game