揭穿公司面纱经济学原理.docVIP

揭穿公司面纱的经济学原理 Economic Analysis of piercing the corporate veil 张曙光 杨如彦 （中国社科院 北京天则经济研究所） （中国社科院，北京天则经济研究所） [内容摘要]本文分析了揭穿公司面纱原则的效率基础，我们首先回顾了关于有限责任制度的经济学和法学研究文献，指出这些文献由于没有一个统一的企业理论作基础，难以对有限责任制度的经济学属性提供充分说明和解释，接着，在已有文献的前提下，我们讨论了在有限责任制度具有效率的领域内，资本的信号作用，以及由信号作用产生的资本显著不足的有限责任滥用；作为资本信号作用的一个特例，我们还研究了基于有限责任分割产生的滥用情形，指出通过有限责任分割滥用有限责任制度的实质是控制权溢价；在理论构造的最后部分，我们经过讨论得出结论认为，控制权溢价的两个来源是，控制权人对债权人的侵占核对弱势出资人的侵占。作为对理论构造的检验，我们用美国有限责任制度的发展历史说明了有限责任制度的契约属性，然后又用国内的三个并非典型的案例，进一步说明了揭穿公司面纱的法律构造和潜藏的经济学原理。 关键词：法律的经济分析 有限责任制度 揭穿公司面纱 Abstract The efficiency of piercing the corporate veil is examined in this paper. First of all, relevant economic and jurisprudential literatures are reviewed. Since not a single corporate theory could be identified as prevailing theoretical basis, it is difficult to provide a complete interpretation for the economic characteristics of the limited liability. Based on these literatures, the function of capital signals and induced abuse of limited liability arising from capital insufficiency are discussed within the doctrine of the efficiency of limited liability; in particular, abuses resulting from the division of limited liability is studied, and it is pointed out that the substance underlying is the premium of control; at the end of theoretical construction, it is concluded that control premium comes from two sources, namely, the invasion from controlling party to creditors and inferior investors. To testing the hypothesis, the history of limited liability in USA is presented to illustrate the contractual attribute of limited liability; in addition, three cases in China are listed to further demonstrate the legal framework and economic principle under corporate veil piercing. Keywords: Economic Analysis of Law Limited Liability Piercing the Corporate Veil 公司实施了一项致损行为后，如果法院认为该行为的实施，完全是由于出资人希望借助有限责任的保护机制，逃避法律对其行为后果的追究，即出资人具有滥用有限责任制度的意图和后果，则法院可以越过有限责任对出资人的保护防线，直接追究出资人的责任，这在法律上被称为“揭穿公司面纱原则”。该原则可以被追溯到美国1809年的判例，当时美国高等法院通过揭穿公司面纱，使得一些公民个人不能隐藏在公