design on the incentive contract of university achievements commercialization offices based on principal-agent theory激励合同的设计大学成就商业化办公室基于委托代理理论.pdfVIP

J. Service Science Management, 2010, 3: 78-83 doi:10.4236/jssm.2010.31009 Published Online March 2010 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/jssm) Design on the Incentive Contract of University Achievements Commercialization Offices Based on Principal-Agent Theory 1 2 3 Meifang Li , Yongxiang Zhao , Feng Shi 1School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, China; 2Wuhan University of Technology, School of Computer Science and Technology, Wuhan, China; 3Wuhan Academy of Social Sciences, Wuhan, China. Email: poplimeif@126.com, zhaosanhe@263.net, sf196293@163.com Received October 13th st th , 2009; revised November 21 , 2009; accepted December 30 , 2009. ABSTRACT Based on principal-agent theory, an incentive contract model of university achievements commercialization offices (UACO) was constructed in this paper, and an optimal incentive contract between university and UACO was re- searched into. The conclusion indicates that many factors, such as working ability, working willingness, risk aversion degree of UACO, as well as the outside uncertain factors and so on, have important influences on the contract design. The efficiency of commercialization of university inventions has a squared forward growth relation with working ability, a direct proportion with working willingness, and has an inverse proportion with risk aversion degree of UACO and with outside uncertainty. Additionally, the level of hard working of UACO under the condition of information asymme- try is strictly less than that of information symmetry. Keywords : University Achievements Commercialization Offices (UACO), Achievements Commercialization, Principal-agent, Incentive Contract 1. Introduction tant role