the dynamic multi-task supply chain principal-agent analysis供应链的动态多任务委托代理分析.pdfVIP

J. Service Science Management, 2009, 2: 329-333 329 doi:10.4236/jssm.2009.24039 Published Online December 2009 (www.SciRP.org/journal/jssm) The Dynamic Multi-Task Supply Chain Principal-Agent Analysis 1,2 3 1 Shanliang LI , Chunhua WANG , Daoli ZHU 1Management School, Fudan University, Shanghai, China; 2Management School, Soochow University, Suzhou, China; 3Information School, Shanghai Ocean University, Shanghai, China. Email: Lisl@ Received August 18, 2009; revised September 25, 2009; accepted November 5, 2009. ABSTRACT In the supply chain by the composition of the supplier and the retailer, the supplier offers products to the retailer for sales while the retailer affects the sales outcome by his effort which is divided into two dimensions. One is for the short-term sales task and the other is for the long-term sales task. For the long-term development of the enterprise, the supplier wants to inspire the retailer to make more effort for the long-term task. However, due to the asymmetric infor- mation, the supplier can’t observe the retailer’s action and the moral hazard will come into being. To deal with this problem, we construct the dynamic multi-task supply chain pr incipal-agent model, by which we analyze the impact of the information asymmetry to the supply chain contract. Furthermore, by comparing the contracts between the sin- gle-term multi-task and two-term multi-task, we have analyzed their different effect on the commission rate. Keywords : Supply Chain Management, Multi-task Principal-agent, Dynamic Incentive, Moral Hazard 1. Introduction studies. Many Chinese academics are also carried out