the core and nucleolus in a model of information transferal模型中的核心和核仁的信息中.pdfVIP

Hindawi Publishing Corporation Journal of Applied Mathematics Volume 2012, Article ID 379848, 12 pages doi:10.1155/2012/379848 Research Article The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal Dongshuang Hou and Theo Driessen Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands Correspondence should be addressed to Dongshuang Hou, dshhou@126.com Received 29 May 2012; Accepted 28 August 2012 Academic Editor: Marco H. Terra Copyright q 2012 D. Hou and T. Driessen. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleo- lus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the symmetrical core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zero- monotonicity, or monotonicity. 1. Introduction of the Information Market Game Consider the following problem 1. Besides n firms with identical characteristics, there exists an agent called the innovator, having relevant information for the firms. The innovator is not going to use the information for himself, but this information can be sold to the firms. Any firm that decides to acquire the new information e.g., a new technology is supposed to make use of the information. The n potential users of the information are the same before and after the innovator offers the new technology. The firms acquiring the information will be better than before obtaining it,