the tragedy of the commons from a game-theoretic perspective从博弈论的角度公地悲剧.pdfVIP

Sustainability 2012, 4, 1776-1786; doi:10.3390/su4081776 OPEN ACCESS sustainability ISSN 2071-1050 /journal/sustainability Article The Tragedy of the Commons from a Game-Theoretic Perspective Florian K. Diekert Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Synthesis (CEES), Department of Biology, University of Oslo, Postbox 1066, 0316 Oslo, Norway; E-Mail: f.k.diekert@bio.uio.no Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. 1095, 0317 Oslo, Norway Received: 25 June 2012; in revised form: 30 July 2012 / Accepted: 3 August 2012 / Published: 13 August 2012 Abstract: Twenty years after the declarations from the Earth Summit in Rio, the world faces an unattenuated host of problems that threaten the goal of sustainable development. The challenge to cooperatively solve socio-ecological problems has been portrayed in Garrett Hardin’s essay “The Tragedy of the Commons”. While this paper remains controversial, it has inspired a vast number of theoretical, experimental, and empirical contributions that have clarified the mechanisms of collective action problems and suggested ways to overcome these. This article reviews the recent game-theoretic research in this field. Keywords: game theory; renewable resources; tragedy of the commons 1. A High-Impact Publication Hardin’s paper “The Tragedy of the Commons” [ 1], which is cited more than 18,000 times (google scholar, June 2012), served as a catalyst for research on cooperation in face of collective action problems. Those type of problems are of considerable importance for resource manag