双重代理关系下大股东与经理动态互惠激励效应.PDFVIP

第32 卷第5 期 系统工 程 学 报 Vol.32 No.5 2017 年10 月 JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING Oct. 2017 双重代理关系下大股东与经理动态互惠激励效应 李 越, 李秉祥 (西安理工大学经济与管理学院, 陕西西安710054) 摘要: 以序贯互惠模型为基础, 为大股东和经理植入互惠偏好. 在完全信息条件下, 检验大股东掏空和经理自利的影 响因素, 探讨互惠对双重代理问题的激励效应. 研究发现, 如果大股东首先实施掏空行为, 经理会选择自利行为. 如 果大股东放弃掏空, 并且经理的互惠敏感性足够大时, 经理会放弃自利行为. 当经理的互惠敏感性较小时, 大股东掏 空和经理自利现象将同时出现. 另外, 当经理具有足够大的互惠敏感性时, 大股东放弃掏空是最合理的均衡. 研究 结果表明, 约束大股东行为和基于经理互惠动机优化公司激励机制是改善公司治理效率的关键. 关键词: 双重代理; 序贯互惠; 激励效应 中图分类号: F272.3 文献标识码: A 文章编号:2017 doi: 10.13383/ki.jse.2017.05.013 Dynamic reciprocal incentive effect of big shareholder and manager under dual agency Li Yue, Li Bingxiang (School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710054, China) Abstract: Under the condition of complete information, this paper investigates the determinants of tunneling and managerial entrenchment and discusses the incentive effects of reciprocity on dual principal agent problem, considering the reciprocal preferences of large shareholders and managers and based on sequential reciprocity model. The findings indicate that the manager will take self-interested behavior if the large shareholder takes tunneling behavior. If the large shareholder gives up this kind of behavior, the manager with a high enough reciprocity sensitivity will give up self-interested behavior as well. However, when the manager has a low reciprocity sensitivity, tunneling and managerial entrenchment will arise simultaneously. In addition, when the reciprocity sensitivity of the manager is high enough, the large shareholder