国有企业高管薪酬、产品市场竞争与费用粘性.docVIP

国有企业高管薪酬、产品市场竞争与费 用粘性 张伟华郭盈良王春燕 北京工商大学商学院北京工商大学商学院会计系 随着经济下行的压力加大，国有企业降本提质増效的迫切性也越来越强。作为企 业成本重要组成部分，费用的降低对“降成本”任务的实现有重要影响。基于 2007-2015年国有上市公司数据，研宄高管薪酬水平和差距对企业费用粘性的影 响，及产品市场竞争是否发挥治理作用。研宄发现:我国国有企业存在显著的费用 粘性现象，企业高管薪酬水平越高、薪酬差距越大，费用粘性水平越低。国奋企业 所处的产品市场竞争环境越激烈，其高管薪酬激励作用越有效，即产品市场竞争 与高管薪酬激励之间存在互补性。研宂补充了费用粘性和公司治理的相关文献， 并揭示了产品市场竞争与高管薪酬激励对费用粘性的治理效应之间的互动关系。 关键词： 费用粘性;国有企业:高管薪酬;产品市场竞争; 张伟华（1984-），山西朔州人，北京工商大学商学院讲师，研宂方向：企 业集团治理与管理控制。 郭盈良（1991-）,河北承德人,北京工商大学商学院会计系研究生, 研究方向：管理会计与价值链管理。 王春燕（1992-）,甘肃靖远人,北京工商人学商学院会计系研究生, 研宂方向：公司治理。 基金：国家自然科学基金课题（项目编号 Executive Compensation of SOEs, Product Market Competition and Cost Stickiness ZHANG Wei-hua GUO Ying-liang WANG Chun-van Abstract： Along with increasing pressure of the economic downward, the urgency of making less of the costs of state-owned enterprises and making it effective is becoming stronger and stronger. As an essential part of the enterprise cost, expenses plays a critical role in influencing the realization of “cost reduction” task when it decreases. Upon the data of state-owned listed company from 2007 to 2015, this paper researches the influence of the executive compensation level and gap in cost stickiness，and whether product market competition could play a role in corporate governance. The finding shows that: Firstly,the state-owned enterprise of our country presents significant cost stickiness; the higher level of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in China,and the larger gap between executive compensation in state-owned enterprise of our country, the less obviously of the level of cost stickiness enterprise. Secondly, the fiercer of the product market competition environment for China’s state-owned enterprises, the more effective of the incentive effect of the executive compensation, which implies that product market competition and incentive are complementary. This research supplies the related literature of Cost Stickiness and corporate governance, and reveals the interactive relationship betwee