a nested-game interpretation of legislator defection from a dominant political party in Japan推荐.pdfVIP

Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government DISCUSSION PAPERS POLICY AND GOVERNANCE ynamics of inter-party D and intra-party coalition building: A nested-game interpretation of legislator defection from a dominant political party in Japan Yusaku Horiuchi Thiam Chye Tay 04-02 Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY .au © Yusaku Horiuchi and Thiam Chye Tay 2004 The Policy and Governance Program at the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government publishes a series of Discussion Papers on a range of policy issues, including issues of political institutions and institutional design, accountability and public sector management, and the relationship between political and economic reform. The Discussion Papers disseminate research quickly in order to generate comments and suggestions for revision or improvement. Since they often represent preliminary or incomplete work, citation and use of such a paper should take account of its provisional character. The opinions contained in the series are those of the authors, and not those of the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government at The Australian National University. Dr Yusaku Horiuchi yusaku.horiuchi@.au is a Lecturer in the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University. Thiam Chye Tay keino18@ is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore Abstract Under what conditions do legislators defect from a dominant political party? We ask this question with a focus on the case of Japan’s Liberal De