lectureMixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(博弈论,Carnegie Mellon University).docVIP

lectureMixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(博弈论,Carnegie Mellon University).doc

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lectureMixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(博弈论,Carnegie Mellon University).doc

lecture11Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(博弈论,Carnegie Mellon University) Static (or Simultaneous-Move) Games of Complete Information Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 11 Outline of Static Games of Complete Information Introduction to games Normal-form (or strategic-form) representation Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies Nash equilibrium Review of concave functions, optimization Applications of Nash equilibrium Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 11 Today’s Agenda Review of previous class Exercise 1378.1 of Osborne Review HW1 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 11 Exercise 138.1 of Osborne We first consider pure-strategy Nash equilibria. How many can you find? In order to find all Nash equilibria, we need to consider 15 more cases by Theorem 4 of Lecture 10! We first consider complicated cases. Some cases are very easy. Player 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 R (p23) M (p22) 1 , 1 3 , 2 B (p12) Player 1 0 , 3 2 , 2 T (p11) L (p21) 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 11 Exercise 138.1 of Osborne Case 1: check whether there is a mixed strategy in which p11gt;0, p12gt;0, p21gt;0, p22gt;0, p23gt;0 By theorem 4, we should have 2?8?p11+2?8? p12= 3?8?p11+1?8? p12 = 3?8?p11+2?8? p12 and p11+p12=1. We should have 2?8?p21+0?8? p22+1?8? p23 =3?8?p21+1?8? p22+0?8? p23 and p21+ p22+ p23 = 1 Solve these equations. If we can get a solution that satisfies p11gt;0, p12gt;0, p21gt;0, p22gt;0, p23gt;0 then we have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if we can not find a solution or we find a solution that does not satisfies p11gt;0, p12gt;0, p21gt;0, p22gt;0, p23gt;0, then we do not have such a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Player 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 R (p23) M (p22) 1 , 1 3 , 2 B (p12) Player 1 0 , 3 2 , 2 T (p11) L (p21) 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 11 Exercise 138.1 of Osborne Case 2: check whether there is a mixed strategy in which p11gt;0, p12gt;0, p21gt;0, p22gt;0, p23=0 By theorem 4, we sh

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