股东投票权价购问题之检讨-民商法专业论文.docxVIP

I I 摘 要 摘 要 投票权价购早已有之，不过是 The Schreiber court 针对 Schreiber v. Carney 案 例开始对投票权价购予以界定，并改变了完全禁止投票权价购的态度，对于通过 The Schreiber court 分析的投票权价购持允许态度。美国特拉化州关于投票权价购司法实 践变革给予各国对于投票权价购的规制提供了经验性参考，结合我国台湾地区对于投票 权价购规制的变迁，最初我国禁止投票权价购符合时宜，但是随着证券市场的发展，公 司治理机制的完善，新型公司问题的不断出现，允许投票权价购，构建投票权价购的规 制机制已经是我国立法所面临的重要课题。 本文引入投票权价购的定义，明确投票权价购对于公司治理以及股东财富的重大意 义。检讨反对投票权价购理由，得出结论：无论是从平等、异化、效率还是成本角度来 看，已经提出的完全禁止投票权价购理由并不成立。本文介绍了美国特拉化州关于投票 权价购司法实践变革，评述了 The Schreiber court 分析，借鉴了台湾地区对于投票权 价购的规制经验，结合投票权价购的在我国的实践现状、现行立法和规章的态度，针对 未来趋势进而提出构建我国投票权价购制度的建议，以期对于我国投票权价购的立法完 善起到些许作用。 关键词 投票权 投票权价购 公司治理 II II Abstract Abstract The behavior of vote buying had been long ago, however the Schreiber court began its analysis by enunciating a definition of vote buying from Schreiber v. Carney, whose decision has since changed the judicial ban on corporate vote buying. The court in Schreiber did away with the rule of per se illegality for vote-buying arrangements and replaced it with an evaluatory rubric with a three-step test. When the case passes the test, its vote-buying arrangements is permissible. The evolution of the Schreiber ruling in Delaware has given other countries empirical references. Combined with the change of the related regulation in Taiwan of China, we can draw an conclusion that the ban on voting rights initially conforms to be appropriate, but with the development of securities market, the improvement of corporate governance mechanisms, and the new company problems merging, now it becomes an important issue to justify voting buying and to build the relevant regulatory mechanisms . This text has introduced a definition of vote buying, clarified the significance of corporate governance and shareholder wealth, scrutinized the reasons against voting buying, consequently regardless of the grounds for equality, alienation, efficiency or cost, which has proposed ,a complete ban on vote buying is not conclusive. This paper has described the evolution of the vote-buying judicial practice, reviewed the eva