股票期权理论及运用研究--以万科股票期权计划为例-会计学专业论文.docxVIP

PAGE PAGE 3 摘要 根据统计，我国超过 70%的公布股权激励计划草案的公司均采用股票期权的激励方式。 股票期权作为一种有效解决现代企业中的委托—代理问题的薪酬性激励制度曾取得巨大的成 功 。但自 2002 年以来因连续爆发的财务丑闻直至 08 年的金融危机，股票期权遭到了空前的 质疑。因为股票期权制度是一把双刃剑，其激励的背面是内在缺陷，这些缺陷在一定的条件 下可能会异化成经营者损害所有者利益的“激励机制”，从而成为财务丑闻的潜在诱因，成为 公司造假的内在动力。股票期权作为一种激励制度，有着深刻的现实基础。从现实基础来看， 现代企业中的两权分离导致了委托—代理问题产生的可能性；复杂的显示经济生活中的信息 不对称的存在使委托—代理问题成为现实；而人力资本的特性即内在的可控性和外在的难检 测性使得委托--代理问题进一步加重。因此，逻辑上一种可行的办法就是将经营者利益尽可 能的整合到所有者利益中去，并在两者之间建立敏感的正相关关系，或者说要构建一个所有 者和经营者基本一致的目标利益函数，股票期权制度正是为解决这一问题而设计的。这一激 励原理在一定程度上可以概括为一个良性循环的激励逻辑：授予股票期权受益人努力工 作公司业绩提高公司股票价格上涨受益人行使期权获利受益人更加努力工 作。 本文以万科股票期权计划为背景来深入剖析股票期权制度，并在此基础上提出对股票期 权制度的改进思路。 【关键词】股票期权 万科股票期权计划 剩余索取权 道德风险 Abstract According to statistics, more than 70% of the published drafts of the company equity incentive plan stock options are used incentives. Stock options as an effective solution for modern business the principal - agent problem of incentive pay system was a huge success. However, due to continuous since 2002 until the outbreak of the financial scandals of the financial crisis in 2008, stock options were an unprecedented challenge. Because stock option system is a doub le-edged sword, and its back is the intrinsic motivations of weaknesses which under certain conditions may be the owner of alienation into harm the interests of managers incentives, making it a potential financial scandal incentive become a driving force within the company of fraud. Stock options as an incentive system ha ve a profound basis in reality. From a practical point of view based on the modern enterprise in the separation of ownership and led to the principal - agent problems resulting from the possibility; economic life of the complex shows the presence of asymmetric information in the principal - agent problem become a reality; and the characteristics of the human capital internal and external controllability makes difficult to detect the principal - agent problem further. Therefore, the logic a viable option is to integrate as much as possi