股权激励对上市公司过度投资的影响分析-金融学专业论文.docxVIP

II II Abstract The emergency of the over-investment came with the rapidly development of economic. Enterprises as the main body of investment, the efficiency of their investment are the core of corporate governance. Investment behavior directly affects the development of the companys direction and future cash flow growth rate even enterprise value. Equity incentive as a method of restricting excessive investment has been recognized in the law. at the end of 2005.The number of implementation of equity incentive company from the initial 43 to 114 by the end of 2011. It must also be noted that the equity incentive just be implemented. Equity incentive system and the companys ownership structure and enterprise system is still in the matching. Equity incentive system is good to our listed companies? How to build our own equity incentive? These questions are the core content of equity incentive system studied by domestic scholars. Forcing on the study of impacting on over-investment of listed companies from equity incentive, this paper introduces shareholder control over equity incentive combined with the status quo of listed companies’ shareholding structure and incentive stock options based on basis of the equity incentive theory and excessive investment drive theory and with the theoretical analysis of the assumptions. This paper choose Richardson (2006) expected investment model to be the identification of over-investment in Part of empirical test .It selected the listed companies from 2006 to 2011 as the initial study sample and data analysis statistics panel. The residuals of the equation represents the actual investment the difference between the amount of expected investment, residual positive as compared to over-investment which can filter out the data of over-investment. Second, in the part of anglicizing the impacting on over-investment from equity incentive, the paper is tested by equity incentive endogenously. After determined without of endogenous of equit