公司特征影响盈余管理的实证分析-会计学专业论文.docx

华中科技大学硕士学位论文 华 中 科 技 大 学 硕 士 学 位 论 文 II II Abstract The earnings management and its extent play important roles in evaluating a listed companys quality and the long-term healthy development of securities market. As we all know, the information asymmetry and goal inconsistent existed in principal-agent relationship are the root of the problems of earnings management in listed companies, and the board of directors and managers are the key factors in influencing the earnings management and its extent. Based on principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory and game theory, this paper analyzed the internal mechanism and behavior motivation of companies earnings management, and discussed the earnings management of listed company based on the board features, executive incentives, enterprise property rights and enterprise political relationships perspective.What is more, taking manufacturing Chinas A-share listed companies as the sample, this paper analyzed the earnings management behavior and its extent in different listed companies by regression model. After empirical studies, this paper found that Chinese listed companies existed earnings management behavior commonly, but companies that have different characteristics have different extents of earnings management significantly. The board of directors system, controlling relationship and the incentive compensation plan are the key factors affecting the extent of earnings management in the company characteristics. Specifically, the independent director system, the dual structure in leadership and the establishment of audit committee have negative impacts on the earnings management behaviors of listed companies, and the extents of earnings management are low in enterprises that are owned by state or have political relations. What is more, the board of directors and executive ownership shares have positive impacts on the earnings management of listed companies. As for the scale of board, the meeting numbers, the shareholder’s pr