双向激励下建设工程质量优化的计算试验研究.PDF

29 5 Vol. 29 No. 5 2015 10 Journal of Engineering Management Oct. 2015 211106E-mail 252888537@ TU712.3 A 1674885920150510306 DOI: 10.13991/ki.jem.2015.05.020 Construction Engineering Quality Optimization Under Bi-Directional Incentive Based on Computational Experiments XIA HaoZHANG Li-bo College of Economics and ManagementNanjing University of Aeronautics and AstronauticsNanjing 211106 China E-mail 252888537@ Abstract For the excitationsthe asymmetric information of unilateral adverse selection or unilateral moral risk leads to the inconsistency problem of the target coordinate construction engineering quality optimization. From the maximization perspective of stakeholders wealthconstructing the cost sharing of the owners and contractors of bi-directional incentive model on computational experimentdesigning different the incentive intensity and different effort levels under bi-directional incentive experiment scene using computational experiments to investigate the effect of engineering quality optimization and contractors behavior. The analysis found that using bi-directional incentivein the cost sharing proportionincentiveseffort level satisfy certain conditionto mobilize the enthusiasm of the owners can increase incentivesand the contractors will improve the enthusiasm of effort level. Also they realize the cooperation a win-win situation. At the same time in