基于关联交易的上市公司控股股东隧道行为研究-会计学专业论文.docxVIP

华 华 中 科 技 大 学 硕 士 学 位 论 文 II II Abstract The problem of related party transactions accompanies the development of China’s stock market. China’s corporate governance structure, economic institutions and weak legal system are conducive to the related party dealings. Chinese listed companies’ related party transactions are quite common and the amount is huge. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the current corporate governance system in China fails to constrain shareholders from manipulating earnings and expropriating minority shareholders through related party transactions. The objective of this study is to examine whether and how controlling shareholders use related party transactions in earning management and tunneling. Despite all the media attention, there is very little large sample and accurate evidence of related party transactions and in academic research because of the difficulty in collecting data and the complexity of the transaction itself. none of them take into account the impact caused by the scale of on the company. This paper attempts to explore in this field, uses all the Chinese listed companies between the year 2005 and 2007 as the sample and provides a whole research on related party relationships, related party accounts and transactions, by buying and impropriating fund, the result indicates, almost 91% of the transactions occurred between the listed companies and their controlling shareholders. Based on the analysis of listed companies’ shareholding structure and economics institution, I lay out two hypotheses: the controlling shareholder expropriates listed companys asset by related-party transactions, and the amount growing with the stake，and the two hypothesis before are validated by the listed company’s 2007 related dates. At last, some suggestions, such as strengthening supervision, perfecting the related accounting standards and IPO system are put forward to solve the problem. Key words: Controlling shareholder；Related transacti