第3章 非完全息静态博弈(博弈论,吉本斯).pptVIP

* Battle of the sexes with incomplete information (version two) (continued) 检查 ((Fight if happy, Opera if unhappy), (Fight if happy, Fight is unhappy)) 是否是一个贝叶斯纳什均衡. (Y) 检查 ((Opera if happy, Opera if unhappy), (Opera if happy, Fight is unhappy))是否是一个贝叶斯纳什均衡.(Y) 检查 ((Opera if happy, Fight if unhappy), (Fight if happy, Opera is unhappy是否是一个贝叶斯纳什均衡.(N) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * 3.2 Applications 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited ---pp119-120. 3.2.B An Auction ----pp121-124 Appendix 3.2. B----pp124-125 3.2.C A Double Auction -----pp125-129. Game Theory-Chapter 3 * First-price sealed-bid auction (3.2.B of Gibbons) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * First-price sealed-bid auction (3.2.B of Gibbons) (continued) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * First-price sealed-bid auction (3.2.B of Gibbons) (continued) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * First-price sealed-bid auction (3.2.B of Gibbons) (continued) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * First-price sealed-bid auction (3.2.B of Gibbons) (continued) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * First-price sealed-bid auction (3.2.B of Gibbons) (continued) Game Theory-Chapter 3 * 3.3 The Revelation Principle 定理（显示原理）任何贝叶斯博弈的任何贝叶斯纳什均衡都可以表述为一个激励相容的直接机制（incentive-compatible direct mechanism ）. -----pp129-132. Game Theory-Chapter 3 Lecture 22 June 19, 2003 * * battle of the sexes 在分开的工作场所，Chris 和Pat 必须决定晚上是看歌剧还是去看拳击. Chris 和 Pat 都知道以下信息: 两个人都愿意在一起度过这个夜晚. 但是Chris更喜欢歌剧. Pat则更喜欢拳击. 2 , 1 0 , 0 0 , 0 1 , 2 Chris Pat Prize Fight Opera Prize Fight Opera Game Theory-Chapter 3 * Battle of the sexes with incomplete information (version one) 现在Pat的偏好依赖于他是否高兴（happy ）. 如果他高兴，那么他的偏好仍然是拳击. 如果他不高兴，那么他宁愿晚上自己独处，他的偏好见下面的表格. Chris不知道 Pat 是否高兴. 但是Chris推断Pat以0.5的概率高兴，以0.5的概率不高兴 Payoffs if Pat is unhappy Pat Opera Prize Fight Chris Opera 2 , 0 0 , 2 Prize Fight 0 , 1 1 , 0 Game Theory-Chapter 3 * Battle of the sexes with incomplete information (version one) (continued) 怎样找到解? Payoffs if Pat is unhappy with probability 0.5 Pat Opera Prize Figh