控股股东、会计信息质量与企业非效率投资会计学专业毕业论文.docxVIP

II II Abstract Most of Chinas listed companies are state-owned company restructuring, the high concentration, there is the controlling shareholder of the company common. Although the existence of controlling shareholders to some extent alleviate the companys managers and shareholders conflict of interest between , but also brought a more serious the controlling shareholder of the small shareholders and other stakeholders of the agency problem . Controlling shareholders for their private benefits of control , distort corporate investment behavior , resulting in investment in Chinas listed companies show some interesting phenomena, such as frequent changes in capital investment , asset substitution behavior , excessive investment and insufficient investment and other issues, led to the decline in enterprise value . The low efficiency of investment is seriously restricting the healthy development of Chinas capital market. Accounting information to reflect the financial position, operating results and cash flows and other information, is outside the enterprise to understand the most fundamental and direct way. To reflect performance -based accounting information can guide the flow of capital market resources; start to affect certain corporate governance. Enhance the quality of accounting information can reduce information asymmetry and agency problems, promote the efficient flow of capital, improve capital allocation efficiency. This paper will draw on relevant literature research methods and conclusions , combined with our unique research background , examining the controlling shareholder agency conflicts affect the efficiency of capital allocation , quality of accounting information by examining the improvement of mitigation of the controlling shareholder agency problems , and further validation quality of corporate accounting information inhibition efficiency of capital allocation , further validation of accounting information disclosure , corporate governance effect