两权分离、债务治理与大股东隧道行为研究会计学专业论文.docxVIP

II II Abstract In china, shares of listed companies are relatively concentrated, controlling shareholders in listed companies have strong motivation to encroach the benefits of minority. Large shareholder tunneling behavior is not only against the interests of small shareholders and listed companies, but also seriously hindered the healthy development of China’s capital market.Therefore, the shareholders’ tunnel behaviors related research plays an important role in the corporate governance. However, mostly studies focused on debt or equity, but for both on debt and equity research of shareholders tunnel behavior is almost rare. Therefore, this paper will concentrate on the ownership structure of the two rights separation and debt management function combined, and talk about management of Chinas listed companies big shareholders’ tunnel behaviors. Firstly, this paper describes the research background and the research significance of listed companies, and reviewing the two rights separation, debt management and shareholders tunnel behaviors. Talking the years form 2005 to 2009 of data for the study of the period window, empirically analysis the tunnel under the big shareholders behavior from the two rights separation and the debt management, finally, we will bring some Suggestions. Reviewing the literature in domestic and abroad, this paper argues that the existing literature are based on equity structure, investor protection and independent directors to study. Secondly, in the related theory on the basis of analysis, this article mainly come from the second agency cost theory, control theory and so on, and concretely analysis debt maturity structure of the influence of big shareholders tunnel behavior from two rights separating degree and debt type structure. Again, we will carry on the real diagnosis of regression analysis in the sample data, and concluded. This paper’s empirical results show that the higher the degree of two rights separation, the big stronger shar