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- 2019-08-09 发布于浙江
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Hume Peter Millican, Tampere, Sept 2006 General Philosophy Scepticism, and the Mind Last Time … … we looked at scepticism about INDUCTION. This Lecture … … will move on to SCEPTICISM concerning the external world, most famously exemplified in Descartes’ first Meditation, and his related claims about the nature of MIND AND BODY. The Next Lecture … … will say more about modern responses to SCEPTICISM, and focus on KNOWLEDGE. Two Kinds of Scepticism Vertical Scepticism Inferring from one kind of thing to a different kind (e.g. inferring from one’s sensations or appearances, to the existence of real physical objects that cause them). Horizontal Scepticism Inferring things of the same kind as one has experienced (e.g. inferring from one’s sensations or appearances, to expect similar sensations or appearances in the future). External World Scepticism It can seem that (“vertical”) external world scepticism is far more worrying than (“horizontal”) inductive scepticism: Maybe I am just dreaming, and there is no external world at all. Maybe an evil demon is causing me to have illusions of an external world. Maybe a wicked scientist has my brain in a vat, and is creating these illusions. Descartes’ Approach The only way to defeat scepticism is to withhold assent from anything that isn’t completely certain. When I consider “I think, therefore I am”, it is quite impossible for me to be mistaken. So I am completely certain of this, at least. By contemplating this first certainty, I understand what makes it certain is that I clearly and distinctly perceive it to be true. Descartes and God Hence I can establish as a general rule that anything I clearly and distinctly perceive is true. I clearly and distinctly perceive that God must exist, because only a perfect being could be the ultimate cause of such a perfect idea as my idea of God. A perfect God cannot deceive, so I know that my faculties are essentially reliable. The Cartesian Circle Descartes seems to be “boot-strapping”
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