外文文献：到期债务，风险，信息不对称 Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information.pdf

Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information Allen N. Berger, Marco A. Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame, and Nathan H. Miller 2004-60 NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information Allen N. Berger, Marco A. Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame, and Nathan H. Miller* Forthcoming, Journal of Finance Abstract We test the implications of Flannery’s (1986) and Diamond’s (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low-risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high-risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond’s model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.